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Productivity is a crucial factor for ensuring prosperity. In Europe, however, productivity gains have 
systematically slowed in recent years. As a result of the corona pandemic, this development could prove to 
be particularly problematic. If the aim in the coming months is to put Europe back on a stable growth path, 
economic policy measures must therefore always also aim to increase productivity. This paper proposes nine 
points for a new productivity strategy in Europe.
Europe has a productivity problem. In recent years, pro-
ductivity growth in many European economies has sys-
tematically slowed down and regional differences have 
widened. The slowdown is connected to decreasing com-
petitiveness, fewer prospects for growth and shrinking 
opportunities for redistribution. Moreover, diverging 
changes in productivity within the EU endanger the eco-
nomic and, ultimately, political stability of the common 
economic and monetary area. As a result of the current 
crisis situation, the productivity problem, which up to 
now has been of subordinate importance in politics, could 
pose particular challenges for economic policy. Economic 
policy measures must have a stimulating effect on the 
business cycle and at the same time always aim to 
increase productivity.
What policies and instruments can reverse the trend and 
increase long-term productivity in Europe? This paper 
proposes nine points for a new productivity strategy in 
Europe. The main pillars of this strategy are: a substan-
tially stronger innovation policy, the targeted promotion 
of technology diffusion and comprehensive, sustainable 
investments in the future.  
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2 See European Commission (2019) Analysis of the Euro Area economy 
accompanying the document “Recommendation for a Council 
Recommendation on the economic policy of the Euro Area”, SWD (2019) 
631 final.
FIGURE 1: Slowdown in productivity growth in Europe
 EU28    Linear trend
Annual rate of change in labour productivity in the EU-28, 1996 – 2018 (in percent)
Source: OECD. 
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Weak productivity in Europe: decreasing future prospects    
High productivity generally reflects good future eco-
nomic and social prospects in advanced economies. This 
is because there is a close relationship between produc-
tivity and competitiveness, and because productivity 
growth and economic growth are directly tied to each 
other, which in turn can create the scope for redistribu-
tion. In the then EU-28, growth in labour productivity 
has been slowing steadily in recent decades (see Fig-
ure 1). In a recent analysis, the European Commission 
even speaks of a European “productivity gap”.2
In the then EU-28, growth in labour 
productivity has been slowing steadily in 
recent decades.
1 This paper reflects the personal opinion of the authors only. The authors 
would like to thank Erik Klär, Florian Ranft, Paul Jürgensen and Katharina 
Gnath for their valuable comments.
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An international comparison shows that this slowdown 
has been a phenomenon seen in many advanced econo-
mies since the early 1970s (see Table 1). Productivity 
growth has been similarly slow, particularly in the large 
European national economies.
Decreasing competitiveness: A slowdown in productiv-
ity growth in Europe goes hand-in-hand with a loss of 
competitiveness.3 In the long term, European global 
market shares and foreign demand may decline. This is 
a particular problem for export-based economies such 
as Germany. A loss of competitiveness can also put 
pressure on the given wage levels reached: Instead of 
focusing on measures to increase productivity, struc-
tural adjustments to increase international competi-
tiveness often focus on lowering wages. This in turn 
weakens the domestic growth of the economy and can 
entail high social costs and structural reforms that are 
politically difficult to implement. 
Decreasing scope for redistribution: Many European 
countries face major demographic challenges. Older 
cohorts with a rising but relatively low labour force par-
ticipation rate account for an increasing percentage of 
the population. The share of the economically active 
population relative to the economically inactive popula-
tion is thus decreasing. The main question here is how a 
high level of prosperity and welfare spending can be 
guaranteed and financed in these circumstances. If 
there are no productivity gains, there will be increasing 
pressure on how consumption should be allocated 
across society. Although it could also be supported 
through deficit financing, this would be at odds with the 
EU’s fiscal rules. In this situation, productivity growth 
creates the necessary budgetary space for redistribu-
tion..
TABLE 1: International correlation of changes in labour productivity, 1971 – 2018
 Germany France Italy Spain UK Japan USA
Germany 1.00      
France 0.64 1.00     
Italy 0.73 0.64 1.00     
Spain 0.49 0.60 0.65 1.00    
UK 0.43 0.43 0.35 0.29 1.00   
Japan 0.67 0.67 0.59 0.55 0.37 1.00  
USA 0.08 – 0.04 – 0.07 -0.01 0.35 0.17 1.00
Annual data, percent change; labour productivity: Real GDP per hour worked. 
Source: OECD, authors’ own calculations.
Instead of focusing on measures to  
increase productivity, structural adjustments 
to increase international competitiveness 
often focus on lowering wages.
3 See Christian Odendahl (2016) European Competitiveness Revisited, 
Center for European Reform; Angel Gurría (2012) The Challenge of 
Competitiveness in Europe: An OECD Perspective, Speech by the 
Secretary-General of the OECD at the University of Bratislava,  
December 2012.
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Differences in productivity threaten the EU’s stability
worked was achieved in the Luxembourg region.5
This is more than double the EU average. When the 
same labour input is assumed, the Southern Bulgarian 
region of Yuzhen Tsentralen only generates an addi-
tional production value of around EUR 4, about one-sev-
enth of the average. There is also a striking divergence 
between Eastern and Southern Europe on the one hand, 
and Western and Northern Europe on the other. While 
FIGURE 2: Convergence / Divergence of regional labour productivity in the EU-28 (NUTS-2)
 
l Eastern Europe   l  Central and Northern Europe   l Southern Europe
Labour productivity GDP (purchasing power standard) per employee hour worked (NUTS 2). 
Source: Eurostat, Authors’ own calculations, Italy 2007–16, 
not included: France, Netherlands, Poland, Lithuania.    
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4 Eurostat (2019) Statistical Yearbook of the Regions [Eurostat (2019) 
Statistisches Jahrbuch der Regionen]. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/
eurostat/documents/3217494/10095393/KS-HA-19%E2%80%91001-
EN-N.pdf/d434affa-99cd-4ebf-a3e3-6d4a5f10bb07
5 The fact that by far the highest labour productivity is seen in regions with 
a high degree of specialisation in the financial services sector allows for 
a general criticism of macroeconomic productivity considerations. See 
Jacob Assa (2016) The Financialization of GDP: Implications for Economic 
Theory and Policy. Routledge, London.
Differences in regional productivity levels: The latest 
data for the then EU-28 show that in 2016 each hour 
worked created an additional production value of 
around EUR 35.4 However, this average obscures enor-
mous regional heterogeneity within the EU. At the level 
of medium-sized regions and cities with 800,000 to 
3 million inhabitants (NUTS-2 level), the highest addi-
tional production value of around EUR 76 per hour 
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6 Plausible explanatory approaches for the increasing concentration are, 
for example, the successful management of the structural change from an 
industrial to a service economy, the geographical proximity to successful 
regions, the percent-age of the population with university degrees and 
the age of the population. See Christian Odendahl, John Springford, Scott 
Johnson and Jamie Murray (2019) The big European sort? The diverging 
fortunes of Europe’s regions. Centre for European Reform; Don J. Webber, 
Min Hua Jen and Eoin O’Leary (2019) European regional productivity: 
does country affiliation matter? In: International Review of Applied 
Economics, 33(4), pp. 523-541.
7 See Heike Belitz, Martin Gornig and Alexander Schiersch (2019) 
Productivity Changes in Germany: Regional and Sectoral Heterogeneity. 
[Produktivitätsentwicklung in Deutschland: Regionale und sektorale 
Heterogenität.] Bertelsmann, Gü-tersloh.
8 Kiel Institute for the World Economy (2017) Productivity in Germany – 
Measurability and Development, Kiel Articles on Economic Policy, No. 12, 
November 2017, p. 31 ff. [Institut für Weltwirtschaft (2017) Produktivität 
in Deutschland – Messbarkeit und Entwicklung, Kieler Beiträge zur 
Wirtschaftspolitik, Nr. 12, November 2017, p. 31 ff.]
Divergence in productivity endangers the necessary 
convergence in Europe: A divergence in productivity 
presents additional difficulties for a common economic 
and monetary union. On the one hand, it runs counter to 
the EU’s objective of ensuring convergence of living 
What is productivity?
Labour productivity. Labour productivity is the ratio of labour input to  
production, measured, for example, as gross domestic product (GDP).  
It is affected by several factors, including labour intensity, capital resources  
(goods and knowledge), production technology, efficiency of organisations and 
regulation. The metric labour can be measured both by the number of people 
employed (productivity per capita) and by the number for the volume of work 
done (hours worked by people employed, productivity per hour). To a certain 
extent, measurements based on employment figures reflect the structure  
of the labour market. It is necessary in particular to differentiate between 
whether full-time or part-time employees are taken into account. An indicator 
that takes into account the hours worked provides a more accurate picture of 
the actual labour input. 
Technological progress. A holistic approach, which takes into account the  
efficiency of the interaction of all factors involved in production, distinguishes 
between the productivity of the primary production factor labour, the capital 
input per unit of labour (capital intensity) and a residual metric that explains 
the growth of an economy not caused by an increase in the labour input or 
capital input, the so-called total factor productivity (TFP). An intuitive term 
for the latter is technological progress.8
This paper focuses on labour productivity in Europe.
the 64 regions with below-average productivity include 
42 Eastern European and 12 Southern European 
regions, the 24 regions with the highest levels of pro-
ductivity are exclusively regions from the western or 
northern EU area. Among the most productive areas 
are many capital regions and large cities.6
Diverging productivity levels: In addition to consider-
ing current differences, it is also worth looking at the 
changes in regional labour productivity in recent years 
(see Figure 2). This shows that the majority of Southern 
European regions with low labour productivity have not 
managed to catch up economically, with many even fall-
ing further behind. At the same time, many Eastern 
European regions succeeded in significantly increasing 
their initially low labour productivity. A very divergent 
picture emerges for the Northern and Central Euro-
pean regions, with the majority having labour produc-
tivity above the EU average in 2007. In particular, ser-
vice centres and centres of industrial production in 
Denmark, Ireland and Germany – so-called “superstar 
regions”7 – have been able to significantly increase their 
labour productivity. This contrasts with a large number 
of UK regions where labour productivity was well above 
the EU average in 2007, but has fallen sharply since 
then. Similarly, in Sweden and in isolated cases in Fin-
land, Germany, Belgium and Italy, some regions with ini-
tially high labour productivity have not been able to 
keep pace with the EU average.
After all, a common economic area runs the 
long-term risk of becoming politically unstable 
if economic convergence is not ensured in a 
sustainable manner and there is insufficient 
common policy coordination.
While the 64 regions with below-average 
productivity include 42 Eastern European and 
12 Southern European regions, the 24 regions 
with the highest levels of productivity are 
exclusively regions from the western or 
northern EU area.
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The increase in so-called “zombie companies” is also fre-
quently cited as an explanation. Particularly in the 
low-interest rate environment, less productive compa-
nies keep themselves in the market solely with the help 
of cheap refinancing.12 The gap between a few highly 
innovative “frontier firms” and a large number of less 
productive companies, so-called “laggard firms”, is 
becoming larger and larger.13 
An opposing view can be found in explanations that 
tend to view aggregate demand as the core of the pro-
ductivity problem.14 At the heart of these explanations 
is a lack of basic innovation due to weak investment 
activity. Private sector investment is often the focus of 
attention because it accounts for a high share of the 
total volume. Only if companies invest sufficiently in 
their capital stock and human capital, will there be tech-
nological progress – one of the main conditions for 
higher overall gains in productivity. 
Roughly speaking, the debate on the changes in produc-
tivity found in advancedeconomies is divided into two 
main explanatory models. According to Robert Gordon, 
the growth rates between 1870 and 1970 were histori-
cally unique and cannot be repeated.9 Key innovations 
that gave a major boost to productivity in many areas of 
the economy and society (e.g. electric lighting or com-
mercial aviation) have been exhausted. By contrast, 
innovation economists such as Erik Brynjolfsson and 
Andrew McAfee argue that the current weak produc-
tivity development is a reflection of the transition from 
a production-based to an idea-based economy.10
Supply-side approaches to explaining Europe’s weak 
productivity focus on increasing hostility towards inno-
vation and inefficient market structures. This takes the 
form of a rise in market concentration (“winner takes 
all”), among other developments. Technology leaders 
push potential competitors out of the market, which 
reduces the broad use of innovation potential. If, by con-
trast, one assumes that larger companies tend to be 
more productive in part because they use increasing 
returns due to economies of scale, they achieve effi-
ciency gains through product diversification and benefit 
from easier access to international trade and cheaper 
financing, then a decentralised market structure could 
also explain the weak productivity at the present time.11 
social costs. Productivity differences may also ratchet 
up the pressure on the overarching objectives of EU 
cohesion policy, such as reducing regional disparities 
and promoting balanced territorial development. After 
all, a common economic area runs the long-term risk of 
becoming politically unstable if economic convergence 
is not ensured in a sustainable manner and there is 
insufficient common policy coordination.
conditions. On the other hand, a common monetary 
policy cannot counteract differing productivity devel-
opments in the euro area with regionally different inter-
est rates. If the objective of a convergence of living 
standards is to be maintained, diverging productivity 
developments thus increase the need for fiscal trans-
fers. Otherwise, adjustments must be made, primarily 
through labour mobility – with correspondingly high 
The gap between a few highly innovative 
“frontier firms” and a large number of  
less productive companies, so-called  
“laggard firms”, is becoming larger and  
larger.
9 See Robert J. Gordon (2016) Rise and Fall of American Growth: The 
U.S. Standard of Living since the Civil War. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton. 
10 See Eric Brynjolfssonand Andre McAfee (2014) The Second Machine Age: 
Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies. W. W. 
Norton & Company, New York. 
11 Federal Ministry of Economics and Energy (2019) Are large companies 
more productive? [Sind große Unternehmen produktiver?] Schlaglichter 
der Wirtschaftspolitik, July 2019.
12 See Do Adale McGowan, Dan Andrews and Valentine Millot (2017) The 
walking dead? Zombie firms and productivity performance in OECD 
countries. OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1372.
13 See European Commission (2019) op. cit. 
14 See Kurt Hübner (2018) Productivity Puzzle – Some Hypotheses. 
[Produktivitätsrätsel – Einige Hypothesen]. In: Zeitschrift für 
sozialistische Politik und Wirtschaft, 225 (2), pp. 21-26.
What does weak productivity mean for European policy? 
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Political economist Mariana Mazzucato argues that 
the basic innovations that are critical for long-term 
growth cycles can only be made possible through the 
interplay of government research, new infrastructure, 
entrepreneurial activity, skilled labour and societal 
demand.15 Investments in research and development, 
infrastructure, education and training play a major role 
here. In the debate on the drivers of changes in produc-
tivity, the role of public-sector investment is becoming 
increasingly important. 
Current empirical studies show that public-sector 
investment actually provides the necessary additional 
stimulus for private-sector investment (“stimulus func-
tion”).16 Private investment, especially by companies, 
requires not only capital but also infrastructure, well-
trained professionals and modern knowledge. In addi-
tion, a long-term public sector investment policy acts as 
a signal for a long-term increase in the demand for 
goods and services allocated to investment activities 
(“signal function”). Private sector actors adapt to such a 
policy and increase their capacities, which in turn 
requires investment.17
The close relationship between productivity growth, 
economic growth and the sustainability of social sys-
tems, as well as the direct link to the stability of the 
European common Economic Union, require a new 
approach to European productivity policy. The various 
explanations for weak productivity mentioned above, 
especially those concerning aggregate demand, can be 
used as important starting points to derive a progressive 
productivity strategy for Europe. Such a strategy should 
be based on three central pillars: Strengthening Euro-
pean innovation policy; promoting technology explicitly 
geared to the complementarity of man and machine; and 
a comprehensive and sustainable investment policy. 
In the debate on the drivers of changes in 
productivity, the role of public-sector 
investment is becoming increasingly 
important.
15 See Mariana Mazzucato (2014) The State’s Capital: Another Story of 
Innovation and Growth. [Das Kapital des Staates: Eine andere Geschichte 
von Innovation und Wachstum.] Verlag Antje Kunstmann, Munich.
16 Marius Clemens, Marius Goerge and Claus Michelsen (2019) Public 
Sector Investment Is an Important Prerequisite for Private Sector 
Activity [Öffentliche Investitionen sind wichtige Voraussetzung für 
privatwirtschaftliche Aktivität]. In: DIW Wochenbericht, 31/2019, 
pp. 537-547; Girish Bahal, Medhi Raissi and Volodymyr Tulin (2015) 
Crowding-Out or Crowding-In? Public and Private Investment in India. 
IMF Working Paper No. 15/264. 
17 See Hubertus Bardt, Sebastian Dullien, Michael Hüther and Katja Rietzler 
(2019) For a Solid Fiscal Policy: Facilitating Investments! [Für eine solide 
Finanzpolitik: Investitionen ermöglichen!] IW Policy Paper, No. 11/19.
18 See Nicholas Bloom, John Van Reenen and Heidi Williams (2019) A Toolkit 
of Policies to Promote Innovation. In: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
33 (3), pp. 163-184.
Innovation, technology, investment: A 9-point plan for more 
productivity in Europe  
Strengthening European innovation policy
Innovation is a necessary condition to achieve sustaina-
ble productivity growth for Europe’s technologically 
advanced economies. To succeed in this, it is necessary 
to have targeted measures for creating innova-
tion-friendly market structures in the EU and more 
intensive coordination between Member States. Build-
ing on the current composition of divergent innovation 
policies laid out by Nicholas Bloom et al.,18 European 
policy – and above all the European Commission – 
should pay more attention to the following levers and 
instruments for technological innovation:
Innovation is a necessary condition to achieve 
sustainable productivity growth for Europe’s 
technologically advanced economies.
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1. Support for research and development (R&D): Public sector R&D spending has medium-term 
effects on innovation. In its “Europe 2020” strategy, the 
Commission included the requirement that private and 
public sector investment in R&D should be three per 
cent of GDP in 2020. This target will be clearly not be 
achieved.19 The new European Commission must there-
fore work towards the strongest possible commitment 
from the Member States to define and pursue national 
targets for public R&D expenditures. At the same time, 
R&D funding under the European Cohesion Policy, 
which in recent years has mainly benefited the already 
highly innovative regions, should be targeted at regions 
in Member States with low R&D rates.20 In addition, 
the Commission should assume a stronger coordinating 
role for mission-based R&D investment.21 The Euro-
pean Innovation Council, which will be fully operational 
in 2021, could play an important role here.22
2. Strengthening human capital: Long-term effects on innovation can result from better access to 
technological research as well as enabling young people 
to come into contact with innovation ecosystems. There 
are big differences between EU countries and regions. 
The Commission’s aim should be to organise a greater 
exchange of good practice for modernising education 
on the secondary and tertiary level. This must be the 
subject of the Digital Education Action Plan that the 
European Commission intends to publish in the middle 
of the year.23 At the same time, positive innovation 
effects could be achieved in the short term through the 
immigration of skilled labour. To this end, it is necessary 
to eliminate the barriers to granting a European “Blue 
Card” and empower less innovative regions to increase 
their attractiveness for highly qualified immigrants.
3. Open markets: Finally, open markets have a major positive impact on innovation since the 
costs of innovation can be refinanced more easily 
through a larger market. For the EU, this mainly relates 
to the integration of digital services markets. The free 
flow of data within the economic area plays a central 
role here. The Commission must enforce the European 
legal framework on the free flow of data, while prevent-
ing it from causing regional productivity divergence 
to increase. One of the first important steps here is the 
EU Commission’s data strategy, which contains sec-
tor-specific European data areas and a general govern-
ance framework. 24
People-centred promotion of  
technology in Europe 
The promotion and diffusion of technologies explicitly 
aimed at having man and machine work together in a 
complementary manner is another essential compo-
nent of an advanced European productivity agenda. A 
productivity policy will only be socially and economi-
cally sustainable if it achieves an increase in productiv-
ity throughout the population and does not just come at 
the cost of a decline in employment. Central starting 
points for this are:
4. Entrepreneurial investment in human capital: Similar to investment in R&D, tax incentives for 
entrepreneurial investment in human capital could pro-
vide stronger motivation for the systematic develop-
ment of human capital, especially for low-skilled work-
ers, and thus promote the diffusion of innovations that 
do not achieve productivity gains mainly through job 
losses.25 The Commission should take up the Anglo-
Saxon discussion on human capital tax credits, for exam-
A productivity policy will only be 
 socially and economically sustainable  
if it achieves an increase in productivity 
throughout the population and does  
not just come at the cost of a decline in 
employment.
19 Eurostat (2019) Europe 2020 indicators - R&D and innovation. Available 
at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/
Europe_2020_indicators_-_R%26D_and_innovation#R.26D_intensity_in_
the_EU_is_growing_too_slowly_to_meet_the_Europe_2020_target 
20 See Marcus Drometer and Chang Woon Nam (2018) R&D and Innovation 
Support in the Evolving EU Cohesion Policy In: CESifo Forum, 19 (1 ),  
pp. 37-42.
21 See Mariana Mazzucato (2018) Mission-oriented research & innovation  
in the European Union. European Commission. Available at:  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/mazzucato_report_2018.pdf
22 See European Commission (2020) Shaping Europe’s Digital Future. 
[Gestaltung der digitalen Zukunft Europas]. Available at:  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/communication-shaping-
europes-digital-future-feb2020_de.pdf
23 See European Commission (2020) Shaping Europe’s Digital Future 
[Gestaltung der digitalen Zukunft Europas]
24 See European Commission (2020) A European Data Strategy [Eine 
europäische Datenstrategie]. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/
info/files/communication-european-strategy-data-19feb2020_de.pdf
25 See Alastair Fitzpayne and Ethan Pollack (2018) Worker training tax 
credit: Promoting employer investments in the workforce. The Aspen 
Institute, Future of Work initiative, Issue Brief August 2018; Rui Costa, 
Nikhi Datta, Stephen Machin and Sandra McNally (2018) Investing in 
People: The Case for Human Capital Tax Credits. Human Capital and 
Economic Opportunity Working Group, Working Papers 2018-030.
26 See European Commission (2020) A SME Strategy for a Sustainable 
and Digital Europe [Eine KMU-Strategie für ein nachhaltiges und 
digitales Europa]. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/
communication-sme-strategy-march-2020_de.pdf
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ple in the context of updating the competence agenda,26 
and assume a coordinating role. 
5. Diffusion of organisational innovations: Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee argue that 
basic innovations only translate into productivity gains 
when the necessary, sometimes protracted implemen-
tation steps are taken at the organisational level.27 
There are great differences between countries, indus-
tries and company sizes when it comes to the speed and 
quality of implementing innovations and modern man-
agement practices.28 While the diffusion of organisa-
tional innovations to a wide range of companies is part 
of the economic policy instruments in some EU states, 
the government hardly plays any role here in other 
countries. The Commission’s strategy for small and 
medium-sized companies (SMEs), published in March 
2020, lists a number of measures, such as Digital Inno-
vation Hubs, which aim at the adoption of innovative 
practices by SMEs across Europe.29 In addition, the 
Commission would be responsible for promoting, within 
the Member States, the diffusion of the approaches 
adopted by the leading countries here.
A European investment agenda for higher 
productivity
Investment is the bedrock for the emergence of basic 
innovations and their use across various sectors, making 
it a prerequisite for sustainable productivity gains.30 
This is why the impact of weak investment activity in 
many European economies following the financial crisis 
is all the more devastating.31 Therefore, a central com-
ponent of a promising productivity strategy is a compre-
hensive investment policy integrating both the national 
and European levels.32 This should be aimed both at the 
framework conditions for private sector investment and 
the central control functions of public sector invest-
ment. This plays a particularly important role in meeting 
the investment needs of restructuring energy produc-
tion and decarbonising the economy, shaping digitisa-
tion and urbanisation, as well as providing sustainable 
infrastructure and modern mobility. Such an investment 
agenda should start with the following:
6. Modernisation of the capital stock: The produc-tive capital stock of European  economies should 
be fundamentally preserved and modernised. All com-
panies benefit from functioning business-related infra-
structure, regardless of their current position in pro-
ductivity distribution.33 Public transport and network 
infrastructure as well as regional infrastructure are 
affected by this in particular. Such a focus on maintain-
ing and modernising infrastructure, especially in rural 
areas, also contributes to reducing regional disparities 
in productivity over the long term, while at the same 
time protecting local welfare services in the EU.
7. Combining public and private investment: A combination of targeted public sector invest-
ment and incentives for private-sector investment 
activity is the starting point for a sustainable increase in 
productivity. It is possible to use empirical findings on 
key investments that can stimulate “investment chains”.34 
Targeted and institutionalised spending reviews are an 
effective tool for identifying and prioritising such pro-
ductive key investments.35 This applies in particular to 
the necessary restructuring of the European national 
economies in the areas of energy production and mobil-
ity as well as digitisation and urbanisation. In these 
areas, long-term planning security for companies and 
employees must be underpinned by concrete regula-
tory requirements, targeted national and European 
support programs, the provision of venture capital for 
growth phases and state support for R&D.  
Therefore, a central component  
of a promising productivity strategy is a 
comprehensive investment policy integrating 
both the national and European levels.
27 Eric Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee(2014) op cit.
28 See Nicholas Bloom and John Van Reenen (2010) Why do management 
practices differ across firms and countries? In: Journal of economic 
perspectives, 24 (1 ), pp. 203-224.
29 See European Commission (2020) Shaping Europe’s digital future.
30 See Mariana Mazzucato (2014) op. cit.
31 See Gustavo Adler, Romain Duval, Davide Furceri, Sinem Çelik, Ksenia 
Koloskova and Marcos Poplawski-Ribeiro (2018) Gone with the 
Headwinds: Global Productivity. IMF Staff Discussion Note, No. 17 (04).
32 See European Commission (2019), op. cit.
33 See Bertelsmann Stiftung (2019) Productivity for Inclusive Growth – 
Interview with Jens Südekum [Produktivität für Inklusives Wachstum – 
Interview mit Jens Südekum]. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=FYaFnRNEE9w
34 See Marius Clemens, Marius Goerge and Claus Michelsen (2019) Public 
Sector Investment Is an Important Prerequisite for Private Sector 
Activity [Öffentliche Investitionen sind wichtige Voraussetzung für 
privatwirtschaftliche Aktivität]. In: DIW Wochenbericht, 31/2019, pp. 
537-547.
35 European Commission (2019) Spending reviews as a key tool to enhance 
public investment in the Euro Area. Technical Note for the Eurogroup. 
Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/40626/com_
technical-note-to-eg_spending-reviews-to-promote-investment.pdf
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8. Solid financing of future investments: Concrete investment projects aimed at increasing produc-
tivity must be matched by concrete financing instru-
ments and commitments. Following a phase of stabilisa-
tion and consolidation of public-sector finances as a 
result of the eurozone crisis, many European countries 
must now substantially increase their investments in 
the future. At the same time, the foreseeable prolonged 
period of low interest rates entails a fiscal policy envi-
ronment in which government borrowing to create 
future assets and sustainable growth potential appears 
compatible with existing national and European budg-
etary rules. Instruments such as state funds, companies 
and other forms of investment for the implementation 
of key investment projects also offer domestic invest-
ment opportunities in European Member States with 
current-account surpluses, as these tend to be subject 
to lower risk than short-term investments outside 
Europe. At the European level, for example, the Euro-
pean Investment Fund (EIF), which specialises in sup-
porting SMEs, could be developed into a European 
Future Fund to address key investment needs. After all, 
today’s financing must always be viewed in relation to 
tomorrow’s profits. Tom Krebs and Martin Scheffel 
show that government investment can sometimes bring 
high fiscal returns and also increase the fairness of dis-
tribution. These investments are therefore still worth-
while even at significantly higher interest rates than the 
current ones.
9. European investment stabilisation: European stabilisation instruments are needed to counter 
a reduction in government investment and programs 
for promoting investment during an economic down-
turn, as is foreseeable in the wake of the Corona pan-
demic. One of the first sensible approaches is, for exam-
ple, the temporary modulation of co-financing 
approaches for important investments in employment 
and growth, as provided for in the new BICC (budgetary 
instrument for convergence and competitiveness) for 
euro countries, if a Member State finds itself in a phase 
of economic weakness. Another step in the right direc-
tion is tying specific investment projects to individual 
structural reforms aimed at raising productivity, as laid 
out in the BICC.36 The BICC’s currently planned volume 
alone is likely to have only a minor impact on macroeco-
nomic stabilisation. Other possible steps to create 
financial leeway for investment during crises would be, 
for example, a common reinsurance system for unem-
ployment benefits or a European recovery fund.
Summary
Europe has had a productivity problem for some time. 
Productivity growth has been declining over the last 
few years. Now, as a result of the current economic 
crisis, this subliminal development could prove to be 
especially problematic. It poses particular challenges 
for economic policy, because already before the corona 
pandemic a comprehensive European productivity 
strat egy was urgently needed to ensure competitive-
ness, growth and convergence of living standards within 
the EU in the long term. Therefore, a European produc-
tivity strategy must always be considered when formu-
lating the medium-term economic policy responses to 
this crisis. The experience gained from the management 
of the financial crisis shows that an excessively short-
term crisis policy that does not sufficiently address the 
structural economic policy problems of European econ-
omies increases the risk of secular stagnation in Europe.
As a first step in economic policy, necessary national 
and European emergency measures are currently being 
implemented, which, in particular, are aimed at provid-
ing state cover for individual risks and expanding the 
scope for financial policy actions. If, in a second step, 
measures are taken to stabilise economic activity in 
Europe, these measures must always also aim 
to increase productivity in all regions of Europe – they 
must have a transformative effect. This requires a 
36 See Press release of the Eurogroup on October 10, 2019, available at: 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/de/press/press-releases/2019/10/10/
term-sheet-on-the-budgetary-instrument-for-convergence-and-
competitiveness-bicc/
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stronger and better coordinated promotion of innova-
tion, a more targeted dissemination of technologies and 
a more comprehensive and sustainable investment pol-
icy in the European Union. 
Concrete starting points for a European productivity 
strategy can be found in the current debate on digital 
transformation and a “Green New Deal”, but also in the 
initiative for “European public goods”. In the medium 
term, the country-specific recommendations within the 
framework of the European Semester or the debate on 
deepening the economic and monetary union also pro-
vide further levers. The German Council Presidency in 
the second half of 2020 offers a good framework for ini-
tiating the urgently needed steps towards a European 
productivity strategy.
The experience gained from the 
management of the financial crisis shows  
that an excessively short-term crisis policy 
that does not sufficiently address the 
structural economic policy problems of 
European economies increases the risk  
of secular stagnation in Europe.
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